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RECENT BOOKS
This departtnent undertakes to note or review briefly current books on law and matters
closely related thereto. Periodicals, court reports, and other publications that appear at
frequent intervals are not included. The information given in the notes is derived from
inspection of the books, publishers' literature, and the ordinary library sources.

BRIEF REVIEWS
A CoURT FoR CHILDREN. A Study of the New York City Children's Court.
By Alfred ]. Kahn. New York: Columbia University Press. 1953. Pp. 359.

$4.50.
This is the report of a three year study of the New York City Children's
Court, a juvenile court dealing with dependent, neglected and delinquent children, as carried out under the auspices of the Citizens' Committee on Children
of New York City with the support of the Field Foundation. The author is
an Associate Professor of Social Work at Columbia University. In a foreword,
Dean Kenneth D. Johnson of the New York School of Social Work of Columbia University described the author as holding the first doctorate in social
welfare granted in New York State.
The book examines the facilities, staff, caseload and performance of the
court in terms of the objective of this and similar courts established since the
beginning, in 1899 in Chicago, of the juvenile court movement. The objective, grounded in the chancery concept of "parens patriae" and the common
law concept that a child of or under seven can have no criminal intent, may
be briefly stated as the desire of society to protect itself against harmful behavior on the part of children by rehabilitating the individual instead of
punishing him. It is to the interest of society to reclaim its dependent and
neglected children, and it is clear that much delinquent behavior on the part
of juveniles is the result of dependency or neglect. Thus society attempts,
through juvenile courts, to protect itself and to discharge its parental responsibility toward children by cherishing and retraining those found in need of
help by reason of antisocial conduct. All states now have juvenile court laws,
though both as to structure (i.e., placement in the statewide hierarchy of
courts) and operationally, they differ greatly from state to state and even within
the same state. Nowhere but in metropolitan districts occurs anything like
a trained and specialized juvenile court staff operating in separate physical
facilities. Here in the Kahn study is a thorough and skillful examination, from
the view of a professional social worker, of one metropolitan juvenile court.
Structurally, the New York court operates under the Domestic Relations
Court Act, creating a unified administration for the children's (juvenile) and
Domestic Relations (support only) courts. The act says: ''This Act shall be
construed to the end that the care, custody and discipline of the children
brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as possible that which
they should receive from their parents, and that as far as practicable, they
shall be treated not as criminals but as children in need of aid, encouragement
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and guidance." The court has exclusive jurisdiction in cases of children under
sixteen alleged to be delinquent, physically handicapped, material witnesses,
mentally defective, or neglected, and "the court is in a position to intervene in
a wide range of situations involving deviant behavior by a child, parent-child
difficulties, or questionable care of children by their parents." Its jurisdiction
does not include custody, separation, divorce or habeas corpus proceedings.
The author and his staff have studied in detail various aspects of the court,
such as "doorways to the court" (i.e., intake), procedures in the courtroom, case
studies in probation department, analysis of probation as treatment, mental
health services, and finally a discussion of all services and resources. The
statistical, descriptive and analytical material is then climaxed by an evaluation
and by some suggestions for improving performance.
Judges in the Domestic Relations tribunal of which the juvenile court is
a part are shown to be scheduled for monthly rotation between the Family
Court and the Children's Court. Coordination between the two branches is
said to be slight, and this is consistent with findings in other studies which have
examined practices between specialized divisions or courts dealing with different aspects of Family breakdown. The study does not deal at all with the
significant problem of integration among all the other New York courts dealing
with family cases. Such material may be found, however, in Professor Walter
Gellhom's recent study of family cases in New York courts, which is soon to
be published. The Gellhom study, when it appears, will furnish a professional legal analysis of some of the material in the Kahn study as well. ·
There does not appear to be, in the New York Children's Court, a strong
enough long-term presiding judge or other personage at judicial level to obtain
consistent knowledgeable handling of docket and calendar. Instead, the assignment of judges to particular cases seems to be carried out piecemeal, so that
various phases of the same cases are heard by different judges, with no consultation or carry-over from one to another. The eighteen judges ( who are
appointed by the Mayor for ten year terms) differ greatly in their attitudes and
skills, as well as in their willingness to use socially or medically trained personnel to develop facts and to aid in arriving at a solution to a child's problem.
This "piecemeal" assignment system, which as the author points out is not conducive to an adequate quality of disposition of individual cases, is not a necessary or even a typical use of a judicial rotation system-though not only here
but elsewhere the piecemeal handling of juvenile cases is regarded as the
unavoidable attribute of rotation. On the contrary, in many jurisdictions
properly designed and administered rotation systems confer the advantage of
keeping the entire bench fully informed and able to ccipe with all parts of the
caseload. But such rotation systems also operate on the basis that once a case
is assigned to a judge, it remains his case throughout its entire docket progress
until final disposition. Such would seem to be a minimum essential for any
court concerned with individualized dispositions, as is the case in juvenile court
work.
It is surprising to note that the Children's Court in New York had 15,670
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new cases in 1909, and only 9,417 in 1952 (7,959 in 1950). The national
trend, as indicated by several recent reports, is one of rising juvenile caseloads.
No doubt development of new noncourt social agencies has resulted in many
referrals elsewhere. Even so, it would be interesting to know more of the
reason for what seems an incredibly restricted intake.
The chapter on the court's threshold service (the information and adjustment services) is among the most valuable and provocative. It presents a
picture-typical of other metropolitan juvenile courts-of untrained, unskilled
and sometimes unpleasant staff making the first contact between court and
prospective litigant, so that the all important initial conditioning, tone-setting,
and sometimes the referral, is poorly handled in some cases. Here, as elsewhere, is also shown excellent and even inspired work by able people, with
level of performance not equated with possession of any certain academic degrees. The author well notes that the court is nowhere in need of more highly
skilled and sympathetic people than at first contact, and suggests a unified applications center which will clearly distinguish between the functions of directing traffic in the building, of referring cases best handled outside the court,
and of initiating court contact as carefully and skillfully as possible.
In the chapter dealing with courtroom procedures, considerable attention
is devoted to the judges. The material is frank and forthright, and no one
can read it without becoming aware of the need for special skills and insights
on the part of judicial personnel dealing with juvenile court problems. In
New York, the work of the court is in some aspects a tribute to the good work
of a few outstanding judges, notably Presiding Judge Hill. Some of the
case histories display judicial skill at the highest level used to aid a troubled
child; others depict a travesty on the juvenile court purpose-as where a judge
differentiates between several offenders by selecting for probation those able
to recite their catechisms, or where a judge reads a long, stern lecture on parental duty to a foster mother with whom a child has just been placed.
Similarly, in the material dealing with probation, the familiar dilemma appears of an unevenly trained and overworked staff, and considerable attention
is given to the delicate problem of the relationships between the judges and
the probation officers. Discussion of mental health services is especially valuable since it includes a description of a recent demonstration study carried on
in the Reception Unit.
The final discussion strengthens a point being emphasized by various contemporary researchers: need for clarification of the court's ''basic role," as the
author puts it. Do we want the juvenile court to divest itself of all the accouterments of legal traditions, safeguards, authority, and vocabulary, so as
to be free to become a first-rate social agency? Or shall we, alternatively,
regard such a tribunal as a necessary evil, and limit it to strictly legal functions,
so that the judge is relieved from all contact with any aspect of each case save
the translation into legal phraseology of an analysis and plan arrived at by
professional social workers operating outside the court. Example: separate
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"adjudication" from "disposition," as is suggested by many commentators who
appear to regard the two as separable.
Dr. Kahn discusses both alternatives from the point of view of one who
is committed, as he states his position in the introductory chapter, to the view
shared by many able social work professionals: "That human conduct is caused;
that ordering and forbidding cannot change it. . . ." (Emphasis added.) It
follows from this position that a court, being an agent for the application of
social force, is "authoritarian" and therefore not able to obtain the voluntary
cooperation which is regarded as essential to good social work. Ergo, to obtain
good performance we must either change the court into a noncourt social
agency unhampered by legal concepts, or gradually cut away its functions so
that all real policy making and decision takes place out$ide the court, away
from the stigmatizing legal phrases and conduct.
To a lawyer-and, I would suppose, to anyone who has ever been a part
of a smoothly working parent-child, teacher-pupil, doctor-patient, or employeremployee relationship-the emphasized phrase is plain nonsense. Most friction
between legal and social personnel can be related to the latter's identification
with this position.
Dr. Kahn's excellent and competently prepared study, however, is soundly
reasoned and based. From it, and much other data, it is clear that (I) the
juvenile court is not doing what it is supposed to be doing; (2) the main
reason for its failure to achieve the promise of its high ideal, despite fine
work by certain people, lies in the unavailability of sufficient adequate and
sympathetic legal personnel, and of sufficient non-legal professional personnel
to function as part of the court operation, to investigate facts, to aid in presenting cases and making plans, and to follow through the post-decretal phase
of court supervisory contact. The unavailability of such aid results not only
from lack of trained social workers, but from the misuse or disuse of specialized staff already available and a consequent reluctance of graduates to go
into court social work; (3) in this kind of court, participation by legal (including judicial) personnel not fully oriented to the aims and techniques of
the juvenile court as one of a group of community resources dealing with
personal problem families is sometimes almost as bad as no legal participation, in
terms of results to the individual child supposedly being rehabilitated; ( 4)
the legal profession, as a whole, has shown almost no interest in improving
its participation in juvenile court work, being content generally to accept the
premise that these are social problems and not legal problems, hence better
handled outside the legal framework.
Until we in the legal profession have studied our own function and position in the personal problem case area, we are not in a position to resist the
recommendations, being made from many quarters and with growing confidence, that we abdicate from a zone wherein we are doing more harm than
good.
It can be demonstrated, however, that the juvenile and domestic relations
caseload, now in all its manifestations representing as much as half the total
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burden of some metropolitan court systems, is not adequately to be solved until
these tremendous social problems are recognized as embracing legal problems
demanding full participation from several professions including the legal profession. For good social dispositions, either in terms of humane solving of individual problems or in terms of efficient use of both court and noncourt agencies,
cannot take place without knowledgeable professional legal analysis of the
problem, choice of litigation techniques, advising of parties, and preparation of
final order. Otherwise the adoption turns out to be no adoption at all, the
"delinquent" child spared that label to avoid hurting his feelings turns out to
be under the jurisdiction of another court so that a vengeful ex-spouse can
defeat custody, or the grandparents work out a devious method, perhaps by
guardianship proceedings, to break up a careful juvenile court plan for mother
and child.
The Kahn study, a first-rate job of research, shows how far the juvenile
court's objective is from realization, what the social workers can offer, and
where the present shortcomings lie. The legal profession has an essential contribution to make to the juvenile court movement, but the burden of proof is
on us to show that if the objective is to be realized, lawyers must fully participate to make the basic contribution of the legal tradition so that children
and society may be served well.
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